This article is based on the PRI podcast, LBJ's War, hosted by David Brown. Defense Secretary McNamara called the president about the second Phu Bai critic report at approximately 0940 that morning. President Johnson and his advisers nevetheless went forward with a public announcement of an attack. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorized President Lyndon Johnson to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States For some reason, however, the second Desoto Mission, to be conducted by Maddox, was not canceled, even though it was scheduled to start at the same time that a late July commando mission was being launched. 9/11. His assessment of the evidence now raised doubts in his mind about what really had happened. The Vietnam War buff will find it fascinating for its wealth of detail carefully set down in understated prose (a welcome relief, I might add, from the hysterical tone that marks much Vietnam War writing). In July 1964, Operational Plan 34A was taking off, but during the first six months of this highly classified program of covert attacks against North Vietnam, one after the other, missions failed, often spelling doom for the commando teams inserted into the North by boat and parachute. PTF-3 and PTF-6 broke off and streaked south for safety; they were back in port before 1200. Naval Institute Proceedings (February 1992), p. 59. Perhaps that is the most enduring lesson from Americas use of SIGINT in the Vietnam War in general and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in particular. The 522-page NSA official history Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975, triggered a new round of media reporting and renewed debate about what really happened in the Gulf of Tonkin. The Truth About Tonkin | Naval History Magazine - February 2008 In 1996 Edward Moises book Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War presented the first publicly released concrete evidence that the SIGINT reporting confirmed the August 2 attack, but not the alleged second attack of August 4. 11. Until the ICC investigation blew over a week later, the commandos camped on a small pier. As it turns out, Adm. Sharp failed to read to the Joint Chiefs the last line of the cable, whichread: Suggest a complete evaluation before any further actions.. I would not suggest that he learned from the Gulf of Tonkin incident so much as that he got from it exactly what he wanted, which was an enormous bump in approval ratings 30 percent overnight, says historian Chris Oppe. Quoted in Steve Edwards, "Stalking the Enemys Coast," U.S. Each sides initial after-action review was positive. The World is a public radio program that crosses borders and time zones to bring home the stories that matter. Neither Herricks doubts nor his reconnaissance request was well received, however. Incidentally, the first volume, Setting the Stage: To 1959, contains one of the best brief summaries I've read of Vietnam history from the end of World War II through the 1954 Geneva Conference. After the Tonkin Gulf incident, the State Department cabled Seaborn, instructing him to tell the North Vietnamese that "neither the Maddox or any other destroyer was in any way associated with any attack on the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam, or North Vietnam] islands." So, whether by accident or design, American actions in the Tonkin Gulf triggered a response from the North Vietnamese, not the other way around. Signals Intelligence is a valuable source but it is not perfect. Those same reports were shown to the select congressional and senate committees that also investigated the incident. Thus, the South Vietnamese raid on Hon Me Island, a major North Vietnamese infiltration staging point, became the tripwire that set off the August 2 confrontation in the Gulf of Tonkin. Unable to catch the fast South Vietnamese PTFs, the government in Hanoi elected to strike instead at USS Maddox. When the enemy boats closed to less than 10,000 yards, the destroyer fired three shots across the bow of the lead vessel. Forty-eight hours earlier, on Aug. 2, two US destroyers on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin the Maddox and the Turner Joy were attacked by North Vietnamese boats. But the light helped the commandos as well, revealing their targets. Interpretation by historians as to what exactly did and did not occur during those few days in early August 1964 remains so varied that the wonder is that authors Marolda and Fitzgerald were able themselves to settle on the text. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, 3 August 1964, FRUS, Vietnam, 1964, p. 603. This explanation held briefly, long enough for President Johnson -- admittedly not inclined to engage in what might be called oververification -- to rush the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution through Congress. The most comprehensive and authoritative history site on the Internet. Maddox detected the torpedo boats on radar at a range of almost 20,000 yards and turned away at its top speed of 32 knots. Shortly after ordering the airstrikes, Johnson went on television and addressed the nation regarding the incident. Mr. Andrad is a Vietnam War historian with the U.S. Army Center of Military History, where he is writing a book on combat operations from 1969 through 1973. No actual visual sightings by Maddox.". Gulf of Tonkin incident | Definition, Date, Summary, Significance WebCongress repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution before the United States' withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973. The captain of Maddox, Commander Herbert L. Ogier Jr., ordered his ship to battle stations shortly after 1500 hours. He is the author of. What will be of interest to the general reader is the treatment of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. But the administration dithered, informing the embassy only that "further OPLAN 34A operations should be held off pending review of the situation in Washington. In any event, the attack took place in broad daylight under conditions of clear visibility. Carl Schuster is a retired U.S. Navy intelligence officer with 10 years of experience as a surface line officer. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident | Naval History At this point, U.S. involvement in Vietnam remained largely in the background. Interview, authors with James Hawes, 31 March 1996. The Gulf of Tonkin incident - Vietnam War With a presidential election just three months away and Johnson positioning himself as the peace candidate, the administration spoke of American resolve not to react to provocation and to avoid escalation. For additional reading, see the recently declassified NSA study by Robert J. Hanyok, Spartans in the Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975; and Tonkin Gulf and The Escalation of the Vietnam War, by Edward Moise. Subscribe to receive our weekly newsletter with top stories from master historians. Operations Security (OPSEC) concerns and related communications restrictions prevented Maddox and its operational commanders up to the Seventh Fleet from knowing of the commando raid. The Pyramid and All-Seeing Eye . WebOn August 7, 1964, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, authorizing President Johnson to take any measures he believed were necessary to retaliate and to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. 1. All missed, probably because the North Vietnamese had fired too soon. The Gulf of Tonkin incident was a brief confrontation between United States and North Vietnamese warships, off the coast of northern Vietnam in August 1964. However, planes from the aircraft carrier Ticonderoga (CVA-14) crippled one of the boats and damaged the other two. The Johnson administration had made the first of several secret diplomatic attempts during the summer of 1964 to convince the North Vietnamese to stop its war on South Vietnam, using the chief Canadian delegate to the ICC, J. Blair Seaborn, to pass the message along to Hanoi. McNamara insisted that the evidence clearly indicated there was an attack on August 4, and he continued to maintain so in his book In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons From Vietnam. The commander also added the requirement of collecting photographic intelligence of ships and aircraft encountered, as well as weather and hydrographic information. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident famously gave the Johnson Administration the justification they needed to escalate the Vietnam War. The publicity caused by the Tonkin Gulf incident and the subsequent resolution shifted attention away from covert activities and ended high-level debate over the wisdom of secret operations against North Vietnam. The Gulf of Tonkin incident, like others in our nation's history, has become the center of considerable controversy and debate. WebThe Gulf of Tonkin and the Vietnam War. Two hours later the Phu Bai SIGINT station transmitted a critic report warning of possible [North Vietnamese] naval operations planned against the Desoto patrol. Twenty-five minutes later, Phu Bai sent a second critic report that said, imminent plans of [North Vietnamese] naval action possibly against Desoto Mission.. This was the only time covert operations against the North came close to being discussed in public. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) decided to resume Maddoxs Desoto patrol, but at a greater distance from the coast, accompanied by Turner Joy and supported by aircraft from Ticonderoga. This is another government conspiracy that's true. . The SIGINT intercepts also detected that the North Vietnamese coastal radar stations were tracking Maddox and reporting its movements to the outbound torpedo boats. While I was in training, my motivation was to get these wings and I wear them today proudly, the airman recalled in 2015. Keep supporting great journalism by turning off your ad blocker. Air action is now in execution against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam which have been used in these hostile operations., The next day, the president addressed Congress, seeking the power to to take all necessary measures in support of freedom and in defense of peace in Southeast Asia.. Gulf of Tonkin - Wikipedia 1, p. 646. Despite Morses doubts, Senate reaction fell in behind the Johnson team, and the question of secret operations was overtaken by the issue of punishing Hanoi for its blatant attack on a U.S. warship in international waters. It also outlined the Maddoxs path along the coast on 2 August and the 34A attacks on Vinh Son the following day. the Gulf of Tonkin The history stops with the U.S. Navy moving into full combat duty -- the naval and air interdictions in South and North Vietnam -- the subject of future volumes. Not reported at the time, Herrick instructed his gun crews to fire three warning shots if the North Vietnamese came within 10,000 yards of the ship. One 12.7mm machine bullet hit Maddox before the boats broke off and started to withdraw. It is difficult to imagine that the North Vietnamese could come to any other conclusion than that the 34A and Desoto missions were all part of the same operation. A Senate investigation revealed that the Maddox had been on an intelligence Hickman, Kennedy. 8. Operation Fast and Furious 10 Both South Vietnamese and U.S. maritime operators in Da Nang assumed that their raids were the cause of the mounting international crisis, and they never for a moment doubted that the North Vietnamese believed that the raids and the Desoto patrols were one and the same. Around midday on Aug. 4, Adm. Grant Sharp, the top navy commander in the Pacific, made a call to the Joint Chiefs, and it was clear there were significant doubts about this second incident. The attack is a signal to us that the North Vietnamese have the will and determination to continue the war." Congress supported the resolution with JCS, "34A Chronology of Events," (see Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 424); Porter, Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation (Stanfordville, NY: 1979), vol. Despite this tremendous uncertainty, by midafternoon, the discussion among Johnson and his advisers was no longer about whether to respondbut how. Just after midnight on 4 August, PTF-6 turned for home, pursued by an enemy Swatow. We still seek no wider war.. The disclaimer is required, if for no other reason than because of Chapter 15, "The American Response to the Gulf of Tonkin Attacks," about which more later. Scattered small-arms sent tracers toward the commandos, but no one was hurt. Hickman, Kennedy. On the night of 4 August, both ships reported renewed attacks by North Vietnamese patrol boats. We're going to retaliate and well make an announcement a little later in the evening, in the next hour or so and well ask Congress for a resolution of war the next day to support us, Johnson toldan old friend. In the years covered here, the Navy was generally known throughout the U.S. Mission in Saigon for being in the housekeeping business, operating supply warehouses, and running the officer clubs, PXs and other amenities, an inevitable part of the American military's baggage. You can find out more about our use, change your default settings, and withdraw your consent at any time with effect for the future by visiting Cookies Settings, which can also be found in the footer of the site. Top Essentials to Know About the Vietnam War, Timeline of the Vietnam War (Second Indochina War), Vietnam War: General William Westmoreland, M.S., Information and Library Science, Drexel University, B.A., History and Political Science, Pennsylvania State University. (The recent NBC television movie In Love and War had Navy pilot James B. Stockdale flying over the scene at the time saying, "I see nothing"; now a retired vice admiral, Stockdale has reiterated the "phoney attack" charge in writings and public speaking.). ." In addition, the destroyer USS Turner Joy began moving to support Maddox. Seeking to follow the established policy of containment, Johnson and his Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, began increasing military aid to South Vietnam. Related:LBJ knew the Vietnam War was a disaster in the making. For the rest of the war they would be truly secretand in the end they were a dismal failure. 17. It is not NSA's intention to prove or North Vietnams immediate concern was to determine the exact position and status of its torpedo boats and other forces. Carl Otis Schuster, U.S. Navy (ret.) The errors made in the initial analysis were due to a combination of inexperience, limited knowledge of North Vietnams operations and an operational imperative to ensure that the U.S. Navy ships would not be caught by surprise. JCS, "34A Chronology of Events," (see Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 424); Porter. The Desoto patrol continued with another destroyer, the Turner Joy (DD-951), coming along to ward off further trouble. But on 7 January, the Seventh Fleet eased the restriction, allowing the destroyers to approach to within four milesstill one mile beyond North Vietnamese territorial waters as recognized by the United States. Soon came a second more sinister interpretation -- that the incident was a conspiracy not only provoked by the Johnson administration but one in fact "scenarioed." CIA Bulletin, 3 August 1964 (see Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, 5. Seventh Fleet reduced it to 12 nautical miles. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident took place on Aug. 2 and 4, 1964, and helped lead to greater American involvement in the Vietnam War. Within days, Hanoi lodged a complaint with the International Control Commission (ICC), which had been established in 1954 to oversee the provisions of the Geneva Accords. The Maddox fired againthis time to killhitting the second North Vietnamese boat just as it launched two torpedoes. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution | History, Facts, & Significance (Hanoi remains muzzy on the second incident, Aug. 4, presumably since clearly it took place in international waters, the Vietnamese claim of "defensive reaction" is a bit wobbly.). Then, everyones doubts were swept away when a SIGINT intercept from one of the North Vietnamese torpedo boats reported the claim that it had shot down two American planes in the battle area. Suddenly, North Vietnamese guns opened fire from the shore. The NSA report is revealing. He also requested air support. The people who are calling me up, they want to be damned sure I don't pull 'em out and run, and they want to be damned sure that we're firm. https://www.historynet.com/case-closed-the-gulf-of-tonkin-incident/, Jerrie Mock: Record-Breaking American Female Pilot, When 21 Sikh Soldiers Fought the Odds Against 10,000 Pashtun Warriors, Few Red Tails Remain: Tuskegee Airman Dies at 96. including the use of armed force" to assist South Vietnam (the resolution passed the House 416 to 0, and the Senate 88 to 2; in January 1971 President Nixon signed legislation that included its "repeal"). The secondary mission of the Gulf of Tonkin patrols was to assert American freedom of navigation in international waters. Gulf of Tonkin incident Facts Listen to McNamara's conversation with Johnson. The boats followed at their maximum speed of 44 knots, continuing the chase for more than 20 minutes. But, interestingly, on Sept. 18, a similar incident occurred in the Gulf of Tonkin. Meanwhile, by late August 3, the North Vietnamese had learned the condition of their torpedo boats and ordered a salvage tug to recover the damaged craft.

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